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As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for 
the record, each containing a number of questions. . . . There are 
thus hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of 
threads in all. If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the 
whole sky would look like a spider's web, and if they materialized as 
rubber bands, buses, trains and even people would lose the ability to 
move. . . . They are not visible, they are not material, but every 
man is constantly aware of their existence. . . . Each man, perma~ 
nently aware of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a re~ 
spect for the people who manipulate the threads.' 
I. IMPACT OF COMPUTERS ON SOCIETY 
A. Introduction 
1. The Computer-Created Dossier 
It is difficult to ignore the impact that computers have had on 
informational relationships and personal privacy. The compilation, 
recordation, and analysis of vast amounts of information can be effi­
ciently accomplished with the advance of computer technology.2 Soci­
ety seems to be entering a new period in which information is a 
significant factor. A generation ago business and government pos­
sessed substantially less information about individuals. Decisions con­
cerning government benefits, extension of credit, or insurance were 
once made on a personal level. Records were simply maintained in 
manila folders and filed in a single office. They were rarely circulated 
beyond the place in which they were compiled. 3 
Most Americans are currently unaware of the extent to which 
federal agencies and private companies use computers to collect, store, 
and exchange information about the many activities of individuals.4 
Every application for a credit card, loan, insurance policy, medical 
care, employment, education, or government services is evaluated ac­
cording to the information recorded in the files of one or more organi­
zations.5 The average American may be the subject of between ten 
1. A. SOLZHENITSYN. CANCER WARD 189 (1968). 
2. Gobert, Accommodating Patient Rights and Computerized Mental Health Systems, 
54 N.C.L. REV. 153 (1975-76). 
3. PRIVACY PROTECfION STUDY COMM., PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA­
TION SOCIETY, 3-4 (1977) (hereinafter cited as PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT). 
4. Federal Data Banks. Computers and the Bill ofRights: Hearings Before the Sub­
committee on Constitutional Rights ofthe Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (February, March 1971) (hereinafter cited as Hearings. Federal Data 
Banks). 
5. Plishner, ''It's None of Your Business." Or Is It? California Addresses the Com­
puter Age, 8 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 235 (1981). 
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and twenty individual "dossiers" and as each day goes by that situa­
tion worsens.6 Americans generally dislike the term dossier. The 
computer data of today, however, is the dossier of tomorrow.' The 
time span covered by each individual dossier presents an additional 
problem. We are developing the technological capacity to immedi­
ately exchange and communicate information, regardless of its quan­
tity.8 One commentator has observed that "[t]his is a unique 
characteristic of modem informational society."9 
2. The Concern for Privacy 
The concern for privacy is deeply rooted in American history. 
This nation was founded by immigrants who traveled from Europe in 
anticipation of a fresh start.1O Personal privacy is one of America's 
most valued rights. Since the . Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, Massa­
chusetts, Americans have demanded the right to control the collection 
of personal information about themselves. The Pilgrims essentially 
sought privacy when they traveled to America. 11 
Today, computer information and records continue to be stored 
long after they have served their purpose. Computer technology has 
virtually created an "information prison" from which one cannot es­
cape. 12 What happens to the individual who wants a new start? Wal­
ter Malone, in "Opportunity,"13 described the plight of such an 
individual as follows: "Each night I bum the records of the day - at 
sunrise every soul is born again." 14 If derogatory information is stored 
and used against a man long after an event, this could never be true. 
People tend to forget and forgive, computers do not. Further, most of 
the time the individual has little control or even knowledge over what 
personal information will be collected. A survey conducted by David 
6. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 9 (statement of A. Miller, professor 
of law, Univ. of Michigan). 
7. Gobert, supra note 2, at 153. 
8. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 12 (statement of A. Miller, profes­
sor of law, Univ. of Michigan). 
9. Id. 
10. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 51 (statement ~f B. Neubome, 
staff counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union). 
11. ApPROACHES TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS, U.S. DEPT 
OF COMMERCE, National Bureau of Standards (Sept. 1974)(statement of Hon. B. Ancker­
Johnson, Dept. of Commerce)(hereinafter cited as PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN CoMPUTER 
SYSTEMS). 
12. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4 at 52 (statement of B. Neubome, 
staff counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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F. Linowes, former Chairman of the United States Privacy Protection 
Study Commission of the University of Illinois,ls indicated that forty­
two percent of the 469 agencies responding to the study said that sub­
ject individuals are not notified16 of their inclusion in a data bank. 
Moreover, it was found that virtually all intelligence data fell within 
this category,l7 Although fifty-three percent of the agencies indicated 
that an individual may review his file, the right to review is illusoryl8 
if an individual is not aware of the existence of a file in the first place. 
Additionally, the information may be used for a purpose other than 
that for which it was originally collected. 19 Sophisticated retrieval sys­
tems render information from computers instantaneously. Computers 
not only expand the memory of man a trillionfold, they extend enor­
mously his ability to retrieve and integrate with other information and 
to send it almost anywhere in the world.20 Centralization of vast 
quantities of personal information and its potential availability to gov­
ernment officials, employers, police departments, credit companies, 
and many others, for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes, pose a 
substantial threat to privacy.21 As people deal with governmental 
agencies, private business, large corporations, or institutions, they re­
alize that paper dossiers and computer printouts may contain only half 
the truth.22 Further, the computer has the ability to "combine scat­
tered bits of data into a comprehensive personal data."23 The fallibil­
ity of computers poses an additional threat to personal privacy. 24 
Not surprisingly, the National Data Center proposal became a 
catalyst for the feelings of apprehension generated by the use of com­
puters.2S Proponents of the idea thought it would: 
1. 	 Make more data available for researchers, both inside and 
outside government; 
2. 	 Reduce the unit cost of data; 
15. D. Linowes, Research Survey 0/Privacy and Big Business, Survey Research Labo­
ratory of the Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, (July 27, 1979). 
16. 	 Id. 
17. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights 0/ the S. Comm. on the Judiciary. Federal 
Data Banks and Constitutional Rights, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 747 (1974). 
18. 	 Id. 
19. 	 Id. 
20. 	 Hearings. Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 2. 
21. 	 Gobert, supra note 2, at 153. 
22. 	 Hearings. Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 1. 
23. 	 Comment, The Privacy Act 0/1974: An Overview and Critique, 1976 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 667, 671. 
24. 	 Id. at 672. 
25. 	 A. MILLER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVACY 57 (1971). 
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3. 	 Enable larger and more effective samples to be taken; 
4. 	 Facilitate the canvassing of a wider range of variables; 
5. 	 Reduce duplication in government data collection 
activities; 
6. 	 Promote greater standardization of techniques among the 
agencIes; 
7. 	 Make research efforts easier to verify; and 
8. 	 Provide a data processing pool for all the agencies han­
dling information.26 
A fatal error of the proponents of the National Data Center's pro­
posals, however, was their obsession with efficiency and their lack of 
concern with the problem of privacy. Professor Arthur Miller stated 
that the apparent victory against the National Data Center is a "Pyr­
rhic one,"27 because the failure to establish a data center under a legis­
lative mandate directing the managers to take the steps necessary to 
protect individual privacy may serve to undermine individual privacy 
in the long run.28 It is the intention of each federal agency to develop 
a data center.29 
Additionally, the technology of security in this field has not been 
maintained, or it is just too expensive to be feasible. Errors can occur 
in the process of data transfer. "The mere collection and retention of 
sensitive or personal information creates a state of severe psychologi­
cal insecurity."3o Some Americans are worried that the existing laws 
are no longer adequate to protect each individual against the "infor­
mation power" of government and other organizations. 3I The public's 
need to know, versus its need for a certain amount of privacy, has 
created a conflict. Privacy in a society such as ours must be balanced 
against other needs. 
B. 	 Balance 
Society seeks more and more services from the government as 
well as from private organizations. Increasingly complex instituti<?nal 
functions, public welfare programs, and large business dealings and 
law enforcement needs require complex information systems. Individ­
uals have come to expect welfare,' social security benefits, unemploy­
ment compensation, and guaranteed loans from the government. 
26. 	 Id. 
27. 	 Id. 
28. 	 Id. 
29. 	 [d. (footnotes omitted). 
30. 	 Comment, Supra, note 23, at 674. 
31. 	 Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 1. 
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They expect instant credit to enable them to travel anywhere in the 
world and expect to pay for services, food, and lodging with credit 
cards. Professor Linowes suggests that "[a]dministrators responsible 
for furnishing these services must satisfy themselves of a person's eligi­
bility by demanding and getting much personal, often sensitive, infor­
mation."32 Computer technology has met these needs by making it 
possible and practicable for organizations to store, retrieve, and ana­
lyze data. 
The very real benefits conferred by information technology 
may opiate our awareness of the price that may be exacted in terms 
of personal freedom. . . . [T]he computer is precipitating a re­
alignment in the patterns of societal power and is becoming an in­
creasingly important decision-making tool. . .. As society 
becomes more and more information oriented, the central issue that 
emerges to challenge us is how to contain the excesses and channel 
33the benefit of this new form of power.
The boom in record-keeping and the expansion of the personal data 
services industry has resulted from three sociological factors deline­
ated in 1977 by the United States Privacy Protection Study Commis­
sion: (1) The tremendous expansion in the use of credit; (2) the 
unparalleled mobility of population; and (3) the enormous increase in 
the work force. 34 
Today information is power. The amount of data that one insti­
tution or individual has over another is often directly related to con­
trol over that entity. The two major issues involved in the public's 
"need to know" syndrome involve managing the information explo­
32. Linowes, Must Personal Privacy Die in the Computer Age? 65 A.B.A. J. 
1180,1182 (Aug. 1979). 
33. A. Miller, The Right 0/Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, published in PRIVACY 
IN A FREE SOCIETY (Final Report of the Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advo­
cacy in the United States) 72, 83 (1974). But see A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN 
A FREE SOCIETY (1972). Based on their field research, the authors perceived that comput­
erized records did not pose a threat to the privacy of American citizens. Id. at 341. Their 
book has been criticized and questions have been raised as to whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support their position. See e.g., Kane, Book Review, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 331 
(1974-75). 
34. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 3, at 3-4. The Privacy Protection Study 
Commission found "imbalance in the relationship between individuals and record-keeping 
organizations." Id. at 6. It recommended three objectives to ensure effective privacy pro­
tection: (1) minimizing intrusiveness by balancing what an individual is expected to di­
vulge and what he or she seeks in return; (2) maximizing fairness by delineating the nature 
and extent of record-keeping operations; and (3) creating legitimate and forceable expecta­
tions of confidentiality by law or statute and by reasonable enforcement procedures. Id. at 
14-15. 
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sion. and the public's demand for greater services. Increased services 
mean that people must divulge more information about themselves, 
and consequently they have less privacy. 
C. Need for Privacy 
Perhaps privacy, an ambiguous notion at best, should be ex­
amined in relation to existing records and record-keeping practices. It 
is difficult to formulate a precise definition or even a workable one. 
Dictionary definitions of privacy speak of seclusion, retirement, and 
freedom from observation and interruption.35 
For anyone individual, privacy, as a value, is not absolute or 
constant; its significance can vary with time, place, age and circum­
stances. There is even more variability among groups of individu­
als. As a social value, furthermore privacy can easily collide with 
others, most notably free speech, freedom of the press, and the pub­
lic's "right to knoW."36 
Privacy, like the concept of happiness, is both elusive and fluid. 
Yet no one will seriously dispute the fact that a modicum of each is a 
necessary condition to mental and environmental well being. Conceiv­
ably, a society which fails to sufficiently preserve the individual's pri­
vacy may experience behavioral patterns such as irritability, mistrust, 
and hostility.J7 Further, it is commonly believed that personal privacy 
is essential to an individual's well being in four areas: social, moral, 
physical, and psychological.38 Moreover, if citizens become aware 
that their actions are being monitored they may become less willing to 
engage in constitutionally protected activities that are expressly al­
lowed and encouraged. In short, we could develop a "record prison 
psychology" in this country.39 Dossiers and files do not actually have 
to be used to repress a people. If the government gives the appearance 
of repression, that in itself could give a chilling effect to the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
As recently as a decade ago, people considered Aldous Huxley's 
Brave New World40 and George Orwell's 198441 to be exaggerated sci­
35. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (1976). 
36. u.s. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RECORDS, CoMPUTERS 
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 38 (1973) (hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT). 
37. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 74 (statement of Prof. Raymond 
Katzell). 
38. Gordon, The Inteiface 0/ Living Systems and Computers: The Legal Issues 0/ 
Privacy, 4 CoMPUTER/L. J. 877, 886 (1980). 
39. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 10. 
40. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). 
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ence fiction.42 Some Americans believe that we have entered an 
"Orwellian period." Many Americans do not appreciate the extent of 
information that modem technology is capable of monitoring, collect­
ing, and storing. The fact is that many Americans are now the subject 
of a "womb-to-tomb" dossier.43 
Mr. Justice Brandeis addressed this problem in the 1928 case of 
Olmstead v. United States44 where he stated: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib­
erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to 
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil­
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en­
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without 
understanding.4s 
Previous dictatorships have repressed society with machine guns, 
tanks, and armies, but repression may come in the form of an Orwel­
lian psychology, with data banks and dossiers. Is not "1984" a state of 
mind? A dictatorship of data banks and dossiers could be just as chil­
ling on our precious Constitutional protections. 
II. COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL RECORDS: A CASE IN POINT 
The obvious difficulties encountered in an attempt to assess com­
puter threats to personal privacy are clearly demonstrated in the 
health care professions. The need to balance an individual's right to 
privacy and the public's right to medical services is striking. The prac­
tice and financing of medicine has changed dramatically in the past 
decade. "Third party payment"46 is now the norm rather than the 
exception. Further, clinical records have been standardized and auto­
mated. If the suggestion of some information specialists were fol­
lowed, everyone would be assigned a birth number for identification.47 
41. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1932). 
42. Hearings, Federal Data Banks, supra note 4, at 8. 
43. Id. at 9. 
44. 277 U.S. 438 (1928)(holding that the Fourth Amendment did not govern 
wiretappings). 
45. Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 347 
(1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable and warrantless 
searches and seizures did cover both wiretapping and eavesdropping). 
46. Id. 
47. A. Miller, supra note 25, at 4. Using a birth number eliminates much of the 
existing multiplicity in record-keeping while at the same time expediting the business of 
society. The wide-spread use and abuse of birth numbers has been contemplated in modern 
science fiction. For a fictitious description of the possible abuses of birth numbers 
("namebers"), see I. LEVIN, THIS PERFECf DAY (1970). 
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Arguably, there are valuable uses for computerized birth numbers in 
the medical field. For instance, if a person fell ill away from home, a 
doctor could use the patient's birth number to retrieve the patient's 
medical history and drug reactions from a central medical bank.48 
There are substantial off-setting risks, however, to be considered. 
Birth numbers could be used as a leash around our necks and make us 
the subject of monitoring, thus fulfilling the prediction of a "womb-to­
tomb" dossier.49 There is growing public concern that the Social Se­
curity number will become a standard universal identifier (SUI). An 
SUI is a systematically assigned label that, theoretically at least, distin­
guishes a person from all others. 50 Therefore, medical data poses this 
efficiency-privacy dilemma in a particularly acute form. For many 
people medical records are the most sensitive form of personal infor­
mation. If one questions the fact that the disclosure of personal medi­
cal information could affect one's entire future, recall what happened 
to the 1972 Democratic Party nominee for Vice President, Senator 
Thomas Eagelton, after it was disclosed that he had sought psychiatric 
help. 
Although a potential threat to an individual's right to privacy, 
easy access to medical records is vitally important in treatment, re­
search, disease control, the formation of public policy, and in compen­
sating the victim of accident or disease. 5 1 
Traditional legal principles and doctrines applicable to medical 
privacy, such as the physician-patient privilege and the common law 
right to privacy, are inadequate to deal with questions which arise in 
automated medical data systems.52 New general principles of protect­
ing informational privacy are equally applicable to medical data sys­
tems: there should be no secret data systems; the individual should be 
able to determine what personal information is recorded; and one 
should be able to correct any inaccurate information. 53 
The privacy of medical records has not been adequately protected 
in the United States. Economic and social issues, together with tech­
nological advances, have even further eroded the confidential relation­
ship traditionally existing between patient and health care 
professional. Further, health insurance programs have been accompa­
48. A. Miller, supra note 25, at 4. 
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
50. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 108-9. 
51. Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: The Emerging 
Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 37, 39 (1975). 
52. Id. 
53. See HEW REPORT, infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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nied by ever increasing requests for information from patient health 
records in substantiating claims for payment. Additionally, there are 
demands for patient health information for medical care evaluation. 
The Hippocratic Oath imposes upon physicians only a moral obli­
gation to refrain from the improper disclosure of personal informa­
tion.54 Further, even if there is a state law prohibiting disclosure of 
information in medical records, it is only for the records of physicians, 
not other health care personnel. In the mental health field the princi­
ple of confidentiality between patient and therapist is considered so 
. fundamental that physicians cannot even consult with their profes­
sional colleagues about a particular patient's problem unless that pa­
tient's consent is first obtained. 55 Disclosure to computer personnel 
for purposes of coding would, therefore, be a violation of 
confidentiality. 
Computer personnel are not under the same obligations and pro­
fessional standards as mental health professionals. Therefore, in the 
case of the therapist, the patient's permission should be obtained 
before divulging information to computer personnel. The Privacy 
Protection Study Commission stated: 
The outward flow of medical data . . . has enormous impact on 
people's lives. It affects decisions on whether they are hired or fired; 
whether they can secure business licenses and life insurance; 
whether they are permitted to drive cars; whether they are placed 
under police surveillance or labelled a security risk; or even whether 
they can get nominated for and elected to political office.56 
In addition, the commission advocated the patient's right to in­
spect and copy his records. This. right, however, is not absolute be­
cause it might in some situations be unwise to give the patient such 
information, as opposed to a designated third-party. There is gener­
ally agreement with respect to the patient's right to correct inaccurate 
information. An area of controversy is whether government officials 
54. 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 218 (Int'1 ed. 1978). The Hippocratic Oath, in 
relevant part, commands: "Whatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not 
in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of 
abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." 
55. Gobert, supra note 2, at 166. (quoting AMERICAN MED. Ass'N JUDICIAL CoUN­
CIL OPINIONS AND REPORTS § 9(5». 
56. PRIVACY CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3 at 281 (quoting A. Westin, Com­
puters, Health Records. and Citizens' Rights 60 (1976». The report continues: "The physi­
cian-patient relationship is an inherently intrusive one in that the patient who wants and 
needs medical care must grant the doctor virtually unconstrained discretion to delve into 
the details of his life and his person." Id. at 282. 
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should have access to medical records. 57 
The American Medical Record Association (AMRA) recognized 
the need for patient health information in providing a sound basis both 
for substantiating claims and for the evaluation of medical care. 58 The 
AMRA, therefore, reaffirmed the patient's right to privacy with regard 
to his personal medical record. 59 It stated that any release of individu­
ally identifiable medical information for any purpose other than pa­
tient care must be done only with express informed authorization of 
the patient or his legal agent.60 Traditionally, the patient's right to 
privacy has been protected by requiring his written consent concerning 
the release of information.61 This is unrealistic, however, considering 
the pressures for such release. It is, in fact, a major loophole in pri­
vacy enforcement. Financial, legal, administrative, educational, re­
search, and audit requirements are factors that contribute to the 
complexity of preserving confidentiality.62 Most patients have little 
choice in deciding whether to pay a large medical bill or whether to 
disclose information in order to get reimbursed. 
Medical data systems generally have three functions: those used 
in direct support of clinical care; those that are devoted to statistical 
research; and those employed in the process of providing payment for 
medical treatment. 63 
A. Clinical Care 
Records that are needed for diagnosis and treatment are typically 
located in different doctor's offices, clinics, laboratories, or hospitals. 
Most Americans cannot locate all of their personal medical records. It 
would be a most difficult task to try to obtain all medical records from 
date of birth to present. The extreme mobility of the American people 
adds to this difficulty. Most of us recognize that the onus is on us to 
perform the necessary record-keeping. 
Computer systems are an attractive alternative to the present 
inefficient system. The development of automated patient records, 
however, has not been widely used.64 Computers employed in hospi­
57. Id. at 298. 
58. PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN CoMPUTER SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 63 (state­
ment of M. Beard, American Medical Record Ass'n). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 62. 
62. PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN CoMPUTER SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 62 (state­
ment by Bowden, The Medical Patient's Right to Privacy). 
63. Boyer, supra note 51, at 40. 
64. A. WFSI1N & M. BAKER, DATA BANKS IN A FllEE SociETY 204 (1972). 
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tals and clinics are usually used for administrative functions such as 
admissions and billing rather than for the actual treatment process. 
There are primarily two reasons for the current lack of computer utili­
zation. First, medical and health-related personnel are not sufficiently 
comfortable with the idea of delegating professional responsibilities to 
computers. Second, medical records are difficult to reduce to machine 
readable form because a patient's individual medical record is basi­
cally a narrative document.6s Further, the problem of confidentiality 
may arise with increased computer utilization and doctors fear a loss 
of control over confidential medical information. 
A significant advantage in using computer systems for linking pa­
tient records is that the individual's medical history can be accurately 
stored and retrieved when needed. Greater accuracy in a diagnosis 
based upon the computer's suggestion is likely to result. The com­
puter affords the ability to compare various treatment plans with their 
potential results. The unique characteristics and needs of each patient 
can be compared with the results of similar patients and treatment 
plans. Clinical computing systems have also been developed to iden­
tify patients who would be unusually vulnerable to illness.66 
If interest continues and costs become feasible, it is likely that 
clinical records will eventually be computerized. When this occurs, 
the individual's privacy will be even further eroded. A data center 
which adequately meets patients' needs will have to be quite extensive 
and readily accessible over a wide geographic area. To achieve this 
constant accessibility and flexibility, it will be difficult to maintain the 
individual's privacy. It would be a difficult task to restrict and moni­
tor the disclosure of such information to authorized personnel with a 
legitimate need.67 Further, the economic reality is that using a large 
scale computer system for one purpose will probably not be feasible. 
For example, there may be economic pressure to use such a system for 
billing, statistical, or other research purposes. Many automated per­
sonal data systems established primarily for administrative purposes 
are also used for statistical reporting and research. The Department 
of Health Education and Welfare suggests: "Since one advantage of 
computerizing administrative records is the capability thereby ac­
quired for high-speed data retrieval and manipulation, a growing 
65. Id. A computer system designed to store records in a narrative format would 
require so much storage space that it would be prohibitively expensive. Id. This is even 
more true of psychiatric records than that of the average medical record. Id. 
66. Barnett, Keopsell, Nesson, Dorsey & Phillips, An Automated Medical Record 
System, 224 I.A.M.A. 1616, 1620 (1973). 
67. Boyer, supra note 51, at 46. 
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number of administrative data systems will be put to such additional 
uses."68 
B. Computers Used for Health Statistics 
In 1967, the National Institute for Mental Health authorized 
grants for the development of a Multi-State Information System for 
Psychiatric Records (MSIS).69 Each participating state has its own 
facility which uses special forms to collect information about the pa­
tient, the problem, the prognosis, the treatment plan, and the recovery 
process.70 The data collected is generally stored in computer files. 
This data can then be used to ascertain the distribution of patients and 
the types of problems common to various mental health facilities. 71 A 
state can then allocate specialists and financial resources to institutions 
when needed. Further, the computer can describe the demographic 
characteristics of clients receiving mental health services, and adminis­
trators can offer better services and programs in the future. 72 
Poorly conceived data collection can result in various injuries to 
individuals.73 Any personal data file is a potential source of harm to 
an individual if it is used outside its appropriate context. Many indi­
viduals are under the mistaken impression that the requested data 
must be provided under penalty of law.74 That is clearly not correct: 
"When application forms or other means of collecting personal data 
for an administrative data system are designed, the mandatory or vol­
untary character of an individual's response should be made clear."75 
68. 	 HEW REPORT, supra note 36 at 78. 
For example, college students applying for government-guaranteed loans in 
one State have been required to provide the State guarantee agency with data on 
matters that had no direct relation to its individual entitlement decisions. These 
data, "for our statistical interest" as their intended use was described to the Com­
mittee, include race, marital status, sex, adjusted family income, and student re­
ported average grades received for "past tenn of full time post-high school 
study." These data have been used to produce statistical reports for internal 
agency use, for infonnal discussions with State legislators and to "run a profile 
once yearly on. . . schools and. . . lenders to see if there is any odd pattern. . . 
occurring." On one occasion data in the system also have been used in a study 
conducted by an outside researcher. 
Id. at 79. 
69. Curran, Laska, Kaplan & Bank, Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality, 182 
Sci. 797, 798 (1973). 
70. 	 Id. 
71. 	 Gobert, supra note 2, at 157. 
72. 	 Id. 
73. 	 HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 80. 
74. 	 Gobert, supra note 2, at 50 (footnotes omitted). 
75. 	 HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 80. 
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Additionally, all personal data in systems used exclusively for statisti­
cal reporting and research should be protected by statute from com­
pulsory disclosure in identifiable form. 76 An organization should 
make no transfer of individually identifiable data to another organiza­
tion without the consent of the individual. 77 Any organization main­
taining an automated personal data system used exclusively for 
statistical research and reporting should give public notice of that 
fact.78 This requirement would give some assurance that there would 
be no secret automated data systems and that the uses of these systems 
by organizations to help influence social policy or behavior would be 
accessible to independent expert scrutiny.79 
C. Computers for Third-Party Medical Payers 
The use of computers for third-party payment is currently the 
most prevalent use of computers. Third-party payers include govern­
ment agencies, non-profit entities such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 
other pre-paid plans such as HIP in New York City, and health and 
accident insurance plans.80 Great quantities of medical data are 
processed, including personally identifiable information. One trade as­
sociation is reputed to maintain a computerized center which stores 
information on millions of persons throughout the country. Members 
may inspect information which is estimated to be held on ninety-nine 
percent of all persons with life insurance issued in the United States.8l 
Many companies in the industry have long shared underwriting data. 
If an individual previously sought insurance from a participating com­
pany, his file may contain large quantities of data, including the condi­
tion diagnosed, its overall effect, its current status, the treatment plan, 
and the doctor, hospital, or clinic involved.82 The source of this infor­
mation could very well be the applicant himself. Besides the appli­
cant's possible motive to distort, or difficulties in recalling precise 
medical information, the insurance salesman is also motivated to dis­
76. Id. at 86-87. "There are few statutes that protect personal data in statistical 
reporting and research files from unintended administrative or investigative uses. The Cen­
sus Act, the Public Health Service Act, and the Social Security Act are notable excep­
tions." Id. at 92-93. 
77. Id. at 97. 
78. Id. at 99. 
79. Id. at 100. 
80. Boyer, supra note 51, at 51-52. 
81. Hearing on Commercial Health and Accident Insurance Industry Before the Sub­
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess., pt. 1 at 38 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on Commercial Health Insurance). 
82. Boyer, supra note 51, at 54. 
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tort the facts. If his client's application for insurance is turned down 
he does not get his commission. Further, this information is often ob­
tained by an independent investigative reporting agency.83 
One agency is reputed to be responsible for approximately fifteen 
million annual investigative reports, of which seventy percent are in­
surance reports.84 The number of investigations completed each day, 
coupled with the use of hearsay information, have contributed to dis­
torted, sloppy, and inaccurate profiles of individuals. The flavor of 
these operations can be gained from the following description of a field 
investigator inquiring about his suspicion that his subject is having an 
extramarital affair: 
You go to a neighbor and establish rapport . . . . Then you ask, 
What's your opinion of X's home life; how do you think of him as a 
family man? This will usually elicit some hint . . . . Then you 
start digging. You press them as far as they go, and if they become 
recalcitrant, you go somewhere else.8s 
In a complaint against an investigative reporting agency, the Fed­
eral Trade Commission alleged the retention of this insurance data in 
their files for subsequent use or sale.86 Some insurance companies and 
employers are lucrative markets for this information. Organizations 
which use these services may know more about an individual's medical 
condition than the individual, since medical ethics do not allow a pa­
tient to see his own records. 
Do credit companies have the "right" to see or give the informa­
tion they collect about people to other agencies?87 Theoretically and 
morally, a strong argument could be made for an answer in the nega­
tive. Legally, however, this practice is difficult to prevent. The legal 
system has generally not treated personal information as the property 
of the subject and has, therefore, allowed a true market system for 
such information to develop. Until such information is deemed a 
property interest of the data subject, and legislative restrictions are 
developed, this "black marketeering" will continue. 88 Current laws 
83. Miller, supra note 25, at 69. 
84. Id. at 69-70 (footnote omitted). 
85. Id. 
86. Hearings on Commercial Health Insurance, supra note 81, at 118. 
87. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in depth the underwriting claims 
processing industry. 
88. See. e.g., Goldstein, Information Systems and the Role of the Law: Some Pros­
pects, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REV. 449, 473-75 (1973). It has been expressed that there 
is no theoretical reason why an individual's privacy right could not be valued by a market 
system in which the data subjects employ essentially licensed data users to have access to 
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are inadequate to protect individuals against this prevalent conduct 
throughout the country engaged in by some of the largest companies. 89 
Unfortunately, medical records may be useful for a variety of purposes 
other than diagnosis and treatment. For instance, would a bank want 
to make a loan to a person with a terminal disease? 
Trade associations, however, are insignificant compared to Medi­
care and the Social Security Administration (SSA).90 Although a 
myriad of problems exist which threaten the individual's privacy, it is 
ironic that the more the data processing organization attempts to be 
open and responsive to its clientele, rather than bureaucratic and re­
mote, the greater the possibility of leakage. An SSA official expressed 
the dilemma as follows: 
We are kind of in the middle between the need to efficiently 
serve the people, which is our basic function, and the need to pro­
tect the privacy and confidentiality of our records. 
In taking 4, 5, or 6 million claims a year and processing 18 
million postentitlement earnings and posting 343 million earnings 
items, . . . we must set up systems and operations so that the dis­
trict office personnel can get the information readily and efficiently. 
Now if we put too many restrictions on obtaining it, then we 
would have to get too much [identification or authorization] from 
people [who are requesting information about this entitlement sta­
tus], or so much information that it would be difficult to respond to 
our mission.91 
Further, the more comprehensive and accurate the data base, the 
greater the temptation will be to use it for non-medical purposes, in­
cluding commercial gain. It is interesting to note that the SSA has 
discovered that the greatest threat is not from illegal intruders, but 
rather from perfectly legitimate organizations and interests seeking to 
obtain access through political or other legal means. For example, 
attorneys seek information helpful to their clients and frequently at­
tempt to collect information by subpoena. Others who seek informa­
tion include missing persons bureaus, skip traces organizations,92 
personal information, analogous to a copyright proprietor licensing various uses of a book 
or song. Id. at 474 
89. Linowes, supra note 32, at 1182. 
90. Boyer, supra note 51, at 61-62. 
91. Id. at 70. (quoting Hearings on Federal Information Systems (testimony of Rich­
ard D. Shepard, Director, Division of Systems Coordination & Planning, Office of Admin­
istration, Social Security Administration) at 334). 
92. A skip trace organization, like a missing persons bureau, gathers information 
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business firms seeking information about competitors, as well as polit­
ical and commercial organizations requesting lists of names.93 
In order to solve many of the problems raised, a large scale struc­
tural change in health care programs is necessary. There is a clear 
trend in third-party payment toward the steady expansion of benefits 
and beneficiaries.94 As publicly funded health care becomes more ex­
pansive, everyone becomes a welfare recipient to some degree and 
thus joins a group whose privacy has traditionally been sacrificed to 
administrative convenience and pressures for public accountability. 
When health benefits are narrowly limited or defined to particular 
groups such as income, nature of illness, or type of provider, it be­
comes necessary to gather detailed information to be certain that the 
eligibility requirements are met. Therefore, simplifying eligibility 
standards could make it possible to reduce the amount of personal 
data needed. Additionally, replacing separate and parallel programs 
with a unified government program could reduce the need to use com­
puters as surveillance devices to track down individuals who are not 
really eligible for certain benefits.95 Publicly funded health care pro­
grams have many political and practical considerations, however, 
making it unlikely that privacy will be of paramount importance.96 
The private sector is controlled only by limited privacy protec­
tions. It is unlikely that they will voluntarily police themselves and set 
standards that will protect the privacy of individuals. Privacy in the 
private sector will evolve further only if there is general public pres­
sure. One insurance executive has characterized an insurance appli­
cant's authorization form as a "search warrant without due 
process."97 It authorizes the release of all information, it has no expi­
ration date, and it indicates that a copy is as valid as the origina1.98 
Efforts to protect medical privacy, therefore, have tended to focus on 
legal and administrative controls, rather than on theoretical or practi­
cal justifications for protecting the data in the first place.99 
Traditional legal controls have not met the challenge, nor an-
about persons who have either disappeared or have moved without leaving a new address. 
See Boyer, supra note 51, at 71, n.129. 
93. Boyer, supra note 51, at 71, n.129. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 73-74. 
96. Id. 
97. Linowes, supra note 31, at 1182. 
98. Id. 
99. Boyer, supra note 51, at 76. Whether or not we want to prevent collection of 
information in the first instance or whether there should be justification of its use once it 
has been collected remains an issue in all areas of information collection and use. 
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swered the need. Privilege statutes do not solve the problem. 100 They 
are designed to govern disclosures in an official forum. Further, sign­
ing a consent form is no longer a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
one's rights, but can be analogized in medical situations to contracts 
of adhesion where there is really no choice. The waiving of an injured 
person's right to sue is the most significant weakness in today's com­
mon law privacy action. The principal difficulty with the consent de­
fense is the insensitivity to the individual's plight when he is faced with 
the prospect of losing all medical benefits. 
In assessing whether an individual's consent is truly voluntary, all 
of the surrounding circumstances should be considered. lOl Too often 
the intrusive offender escapes the responsibility and the loss of privacy 
is blamed on the victim. 102 The focus on genuine informed consent to 
medical procedures and disclosure of medical information might pro­
vide some real guidance in this area. Legislative recognition in sup­
port of prohibiting certain requests, and requiring adequate disclosure 
of the risks, is long overdue. 
Traditional- privacy and privilege doctrines are creatures of di­
verse state statutory or common law provisions. A major obstacle to 
the recognition of the privacy right is the fact that without uniform 
national standards, privacy is determined on a state by state basis. It 
is extremely difficult to apply these privacy rights to a system that is 
most often part of multi-state or multi-national communication net­
works. Perhaps this recognition of privacy rights and privileges must 
be joined with greater legislative controls. Common law causes of ac­
tion for the invasion of privacy were not formulated with the objective 
of regulating the disclosure of medical information. The prevailing 
systems and statutes have not contributed to confidentiality, unless 
100. Id. 
101. [d. 
102: See, e.g., Miller, supra note 25, at 86 (quoting Hearings on Commercial Credit 
Bureaus Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Gov't Operations, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1968». 
A blatant example of an attempt to hide behind the consent shield to immu­
nize practices is one national credit bureau's reaction when it became alarmed by 
a congressional investigation and the prospect of subsequent regulation. It began 
to include the following clause in its credit application form: 
I hereby authorize the person to whom this application is made, or any credit 
bureau or any other investigative agency employed by such person, to investigate 
the references herein listed, or statements, or other information, oral or written, 
obtained from me or any other person pertaining to my credit and financial re­
sponsibility. __ . I hereby release any claims, damages and suits whatsoever 
which may at any time be asserted by me by reason of such investigation. 
[d. 
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"confidentiality" includes protecting the patient from securing infor­
mation about himself. The advent of computers, however, has stimu­
lated a long overdue concern for privacy that might prove beneficial if 
it can be sustained. This obvious threat to privacy has triggered a 
needed awareness. The real challenge is to devise a method for balanc­
ing the competing interests of privacy against other significant social 
benefits. 
III. ATIEMPTS AT PARITY: THE EsTABLISHED LEGAL CONTROLS 
A. Constitutional Recognition 
1. Origins 
Privacy is not specifically mentioned in the United States Consti­
tution. The Constitution has, however, provided the source for the 
right to privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized that "a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy" 
does exist under the Constitution. 103 The Court has found the roots of 
that right in the First Amendment,I04 Third Amendment, lOS Fourth 
Amendment,I06 Fifth Amendment,107 Ninth Amendment,108 the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,l09 and in the penum­
bras of the Bill of RightS. 110 This American right to privacy is an 
individual constitutional right, but one which is not absolute. Courts 
have refused to recognize an unlimited right to privacy in the past. 
States have compelled the sterilization of certain individuals, III and 
vaccinations in circumstances where there has been a compelling state 
interest. I 12 
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972). 
104. E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969)(holding that the First 
Amendment guarantees freedom of speech and assembly). 
105. The Third Amendment prohibits the lodging of soldiers in private homes. U.S. 
CoNST. amend. III. 
106. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from being searched arbitrarily by the 
government. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
107. Courts interpret a right to privacy in the Fifth Amendment which protects 
against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Ninth Amendment gives 
the people all rights not specifically delegated to the States and Federal government. Id. at 
492 (Goldberg, J. concurring). 
109. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees each citizen equal protection of the 
laws. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. 
110. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
111. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942). The Supreme court has increasingly recognized an individual's rights with 
regard to procreation. Id. 
112. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905). 
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2. Developments 
The Supreme Court ruled in NAA CP v. Alabama 113 that there is a 
constitutional right to privacy in one's associations. 114 In Tulley v. 
California lls the Court affirmed the necessity of anonymous political 
activity for the proper functioning of free society.1l6 In Griswold v. 
Connecticut ll7 the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute 
which made it a crime to use contraceptives. Justice Douglas reasoned 
that there were private rights surrounding various amendments to the 
Constitution and specifically mentioned the First Amendment zone of 
privacy with regard to private personal functions. lls 
Four years later, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia ll9 struck down 
Georgia's law which made it illegal to possess pornography in one's 
home. The Court held that the government cannot pry into one's 
thoughts, feelings, and mind. 120 In Wisconsin v. Constantineau l21 the 
Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute which permitted a po­
lice chief to post a list of persons whom he thought were alcoholics. 
The purpose of the list was to prohibit others from contributing to the 
addiction of those listed by not providing them with alcoholic bever­
ages. 122 The Court, however, recognized the Constitutional implica­
tions of an invasion of personal privacy that could permanently label 
an individual. 123 
A Texas statute banning abortion was invalidated in Roe v. 
Wade. 124 The Court held that there was a violation of the right to 
privacy as "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per­
sonalliberty and restrictions upon state action."12s The importance of 
procreative autonomy as an element of individual liberty was reaf­
firmed in Eisenstadt v. Baird.126 There now exists a private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter. There is a constitutionally 
113. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
114. Id. 
115. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
116. Id. at 64-65. 
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the zone of privacy is created by several fun­
damental constitutional guarantees as specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights). 
118. Id. at 485. 
119. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
120. Id. at 565. 
121. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
122. Id. at 435, n.2. 
123. Id. at 437. 
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
125. Id. at 153. 
126. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Eisenstadt Court recognized that procreative auton­
omy includes both the right to remain fertile and the right to avoid contraception. The 
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protected right to privacy, which means that an individual may make 
procreative decisions without governmental interference. 
The Supreme Court's focus with respect to privacy has been on 
personal autonomy and freedom from governmental interference. The 
Court's decisions recognizing a constitutional privacy right in these 
areas raised the possibility that a general right to privacy for matters 
relating to medical treatment might emerge and restrict the govern­
ment's power to gather medical records. 127 This possibility, however, 
remains unrealized. 
In Schulman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.128 a 
city ordinance was upheld requiring that names of abortion patients be 
reported on a "termination of pregnancy" certificate which is then 
filed in a central registry .129 The court held that the constitutional 
privacy claim must fail because there was a compelling state interest to 
provide statistical information about the effect of abortions and to pro­
vide counseling on family planning. 130 
Although the Supreme Court's recent decisions have not dealt 
specifically with the collection of medical data, in California Bankers 
Ass'n v. Schultz l3 ! the Court held that there was no right to privacy 
protection in bank records kept by a bank in accordance with federal 
regulations.132 Additionally, the Court held that the Fourth Amend­
ment challenges to the reporting requirements failed because the statu­
tory purposes were reasonable.133 Moreover, the bank could not 
challenge the requirements on the ground of self-incrimination, !34 and 
the depositer plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the domestic re-
Court pointed out that the intimacy and gravity of contraceptive decisions are not lessened 
by the absence of marriage. Id. at 453. 
See also Carey v. Population Services Inn, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Carey Court 
reaffirmed both the right of all persons to make contraceptive decisions, and the fundamen­
tal right of autonomy in the decision whether or not to beget or bear children. Id. at 684-85. 
127. Boyer, supra note 51, at 89. See e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., concurring)("the right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the 
physician-patient relationship"). 
128. 44 A.D. 2d 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974). 
129. Id. at 483, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 782. 
130. Id. at 486, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 485. See also Whelen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) 
(upholding a statute requiring physicians to report certain prescriptions given for 
barbiturates). 
131. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
132. Id. at 66-67. 
133. Id. at 67. 
134. Id. at 75. The challenge, however, was premature. The court left the issue of 
whether the bank could claim the privilege for resolution when the chalIenge is properly 
before the court. Id. . 
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porting regulations. 13s It appears that the Court is willing to defer the 
regulation of data collection to other branches of government. Thus, 
the Court has not expanded constitutional privacy broadly into infor­
mational policy areas. 136 
B. Common Law 
1. Background 
The concept of privacy was not recognized at English common 
law. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first introduced the 
idea of a legal right to privacy in a law review article. 137 They de­
clared privacy to be "a part of the person"138 and asserted that there 
was a right to be free from pUblicity when one had not voluntarily 
placed himself under public scrutiny. They analogized the privacy 
right to the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publica­
tion of his name or personal information. 139 Despite the authors' per­
suasiveness, however, their thesis was opinion, not law. It remained 
for the courts to give it their imprimatur. 140 The first major test came 
in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 141 in which a 
milling company used a woman's picture without her consent to pro­
mote the sale of its flour. The court rejected her claim for relief based 
on her humiliation. The court held relief would have to come from 
the legislature. 142 The New York Legislature did respond and other 
states followed. 143 Courts in almost every state eventually began to 
recognize a person's right to seek a remedy for an invasion of 
privacy. 144 
2. Privacy Torts 
Professor William L. Prosser defined four kinds of privacy torts 
135. Id. 
136. See. e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976). In this case the plaintifrs 
picture had been circulated to town merchants as an active shoplifter. He had been 
charged, but never prosecuted for the offense. The plaintiff sued the Chief of Police for 
violating his constitutional right of privacy. The Court held that this case was not within 
the "zones" of recognized rights. Id. at 713. 
137. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Miller, supra note 25, at 171. 
141. 171 N.Y. 538,64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
142. Id. at 544, 64 N.E. at 443. 
143. See infra notes 253-255 and accompanying text. 
144. States are not consistent with regard to the dimensions of a person's right to 
privacy. 
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which were recognized at common law: 14S (1) Intrusion upon the 
plaintiirs physical solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private 
facts; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of one's 
name or likeness for the commercial benefit of another. 
The tort of intrusion extends to eavesdroppingl46 and the use of 
microphones. 147 Professor Arthur Miller concluded that although the 
intrusion concept may be a useful approach for remedying wiretap­
ping, electronic eavesdropping, or physical or sensory surveillance, it 
does not afford much protection against misuse of computerized infor­
mation. 148 He reasoned that the privacy tort is designed to deter di­
rect physical invasion which is not the case with computerized 
information. 149 Additionally, the tort deals with the nature of the con­
duct that constitutes the privacy violation rather than what is done 
with the fruits of the invasion. In the context of computerized infor­
mation, it is what is done with the data that presents the greatest 
threat to privacy. ISO 
The public disclosure of private facts has found a cause of action 
in the pUblicity of highly private information. Even if the information 
were true and there would be no action for defamation, a cause of 
action may still exist. lSI This tort may be most applicable to computer 
cases and the abuses that are likely to arise in modern medical record 
systems. There are problems, however, as the private facts must be 
disclosed to the public at large. "The few reported cases involving 
medical information seem to arise out of sensationalized reports of 
freakish maladies"ls2 or case history studies in which the researcher 
has failed to conceal the subject's identity.ls3 An unauthorized user of 
an individual's computerized file can use the misappropriated data to 
damage its subject without further disseminating its contents. Addi­
tionally, the disclosed information must be information normally con­
sidered to be private. This could always be the subject of considerable 
dispute. Professor Miller contends that if sensitive material is com­
mingled with less sensitive material in a computer, the entire mass of 
145. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 804-814 (4th ed. 1971). 
146. See, e.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965). 
147. See, e.g., Elson v. Bowen, 436 P.2d 12 (1967). 
148. Miller, supra note 25, at 171. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 174. 
151. PROSSER, supra note 145, at 809. 
152. Boyer, supra note 51, at 79. 
153. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823 (1973). A psychothera­
pist published a book on intimate relations about a patient and her family. Plaintiff claimed 
that she and her family were easily identifiable. Id. 
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data may be given less protection because it may be treated as low 
level sensitivity.ls4 The final requirement is that the disclosure must 
be offensive to a person with ordinary sensibilities. ISS Miller suggests, 
however, that we might become accustomed to the revelation of the 
intimate details of a person's life just as we have become accustomed 
to offensive television commercials. ls6 
False light is similar to if not indistinguishable from defamation. 
The common law of defamation involves the publication of false infor­
mation that injures reputation: "A communication is defamatory if it 
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him."ls7 If a publication harms the reputation of an­
other by sUbjecting him to hatred or shame, a cause of action for defa­
mation will lie. Since the statement must be false, there is no conflict 
with the First Amendment which arguably protects only the truth. ISS 
The Supreme Court expanded this requirement in the landmark case 
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. ls9 The Court held there could be 
no liability for defamatory falsehoods unless it was known that the 
statement was false, or made with reckless disregard to the truth. l60 
The holding applied to public officials and was subsequently extended 
to public figures. 161 The Court, however, refused to extend this re­
quirement to non-public figures and ordinary citizens. 162 The Court, 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, addresses only defamation. Pri­
vacy, however, is addressed when publication is an element of the tort. 
The false light principle should be expanded to permit law suits 
by those who ate injured by information which is disclosed and is mis­
leading. Additionally, the courts should de-emphasize the require­
ment of disclosure at large "if the theory is to be responsive to the way 
m which computerized information will be used in a dossier 
154. Miller, supra note 25 at 174. 
155. The ordinary sensibilities standard parallels the reasonable person standard in 
tort law. For more complete treatment of the reasonable person standard. See PROSSER, 
supra note 145, at 149-166. 
156. Miller, supra note 25, at 177-78. 
157. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938). 
158. Trubow, Fighting off the New Technology, 10 Human Rts. 27, 28 (1982). 
159. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
160. Id. at 280. 
161. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
162. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See Cantrell v. Forest City 
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (leaving open the question in a false light privacy 
invasion case whether there should be a lesser standard than that applied in Sullivan). See 
also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (holding that "the inter­
ests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record."). 
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society. " 163 
Should the criterion for triggering a privacy claim be tangible in­
jury, or simply outrage and emotional distress from wrongfully dis­
closed information? Should privacy be protected as Warren and 
Brandeis first suggested, in the notion of "inviolate personality," or 
merely in a property context after a pecuniary 10SS?I64 Further, 
should one be compensated for lost opportunity due to the wrongful 
disclosure of information? Can Senator Eagelton ever be compensated 
for the lost opportunity of being elected vice-president and perhaps 
even succeeding to the White House? 
3. Privacy as a Property Interest 
It may be easier to formulate privacy guidelines in a property 
context. It has been suggested that personal information be recog­
nized as a property interest under traditional property law. A cause of 
action would, therefore, be available to a victim for information abuse 
because as "owner" of the information there would be an abuse of his 
interest.16S 
Further, who is entitled to privacy, individuals only, or corpora­
tions and government? Additionally, should an information policy 
govern information practices of individuals? What about the com­
puter enthusiast with a home computer? Even national data banks are 
accessible by personal computers. At common law, the concept of pri­
vacy was modeled on mass dissemination and thus extremely restric­
tive. Typically the common law of informational privacy was 
designed to compensate a victim after intimate personal information 
was divulged about him in one of the mass media. 166 To establish a 
claim, an individual must prove a disclosure of personal facts to the 
public. 
Personal privacy as developed by the courts has been in reaction 
to the media of mass communication. Usually the individual will see 
it or it will be brought to his attention and he will respond to it with a 
law suit. Computers present a more complicated situation. You are 
not dealing with a mass dissemination; something you can see and 
hear and respond to, and if you are aggrieved, take the publisher to 
court. You are dealing with records stored somewhere in electronic 
163. Miller. supra note 25. at 184-85. 
164. Trubow. supra note 158. at 52. 
165. Miller. Symposium: Computers. Data Banks and Individual Privacy. 53 
MINN.L.REv. 212 (1968). 
166. Hearings, Federal Data Banks. supra note 4. at 17. 
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form in some federal or state agency or some corporation or univer­
sity, of which the individual probably has no knowledge. 
. . . [T]he person most concerned with the information, the 
person who will be affected by others seeing and acting on it, often 
has the least access to it. The law of privacy as we know it today 
simply has not developed or reacted to this problem. 167 
C. Legislative Recognition 
Neither the common law privacy right, nor the existing statutory 
situation is adequate to handle the need to strike the appropriate bal­
ance between the individual's need for privacy and society's need for 
information. Nevertheless, it is Congress and the states to which we 
must look for the protection of informational privacy. Since privacy is 
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution and because of the spe­
cific protection given speech and press in the First Amendment, the 
answer appears to rest with the legislature. Additionally, the estab­
lishment of agencies might be a possible solution and only Congress is 
capable of developing broad guidelines for these agencies. The judici­
ary is not capable of this task. 168 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) was the first leg­
islative recognition of the right of the individual citizen to have access 
to his or her informational profile. 169 It was also the first federal legis­
lation enacted to regulate personal information maintained by the pri­
vate sector. The Act requires that credit investigation and reporting 
agencies make their records available to the data subject. 170 Additiori­
ally, the agencies must provide procedures to correct information and 
to respect the confidentiality and proper utilization of the information. 
Individuals may challenge the fairness, accuracy, and timeliness of the 
information. l7l The individual, not the business entity, is protected 
under the FCRA. Moreover, it is interesting to note that consumer 
credit reports are deemed. commercial speech, which is outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. 172 The FCRA has been the only 
167. [d. 
168. Not everyone is convinced that legislative controls over personal data systems 
are necessary. Robert H. Long, Director of ACT, Bank Administration Institute, has 
stated: "The way to protect privacy and confidentiality is to improve the procedures of 
redress, not to attempt to control every personal data file at a government level." PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY IN CoMPUTER SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at VIII. 
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-168lt (1976 & Supp. 1980). 
170. Id. § 1681g. 
171. Id. § 168li. 
172. Id. 
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significant attempt at the federal level to impose information privacy 
rights on the private sector. The Act requires that an individual be 
notified when an adverse action (such as denial of credit) is taken on 
the basis of a report from an agency. 173 
The Act, however, has major inadequacies. The list of people to 
whom disclosure is permitted is both too vague and too broad. It in­
cludes anyone with a "legitimate business need" for informationP4 
Moreover, enforcement authority rests with the Federal Trade Com­
mission which has been laxps Further, "few consumers have the 
funds necessary to engage in' expensive litigation when the Federal 
Trade Commission declines to act." 176 
The most comprehensive regulatory scheme is contained in the 
Privacy Act of 1974.177 The Act applies to information systems which 
are operated· by the federal government. The Act does not deal with 
data systems operated by private organizations or state and local gov­
ernments. 178 It attempts to promote governmental respect for the pri­
vacy of citizens by requiring agencies to observe certain rules. in the 
computerization, use, and disclosure of information. 179 
The goals of the Act were set forth in the HEW Report: (1) 
There should be no secret data record-keeping systems; (2) an individ­
ual should be able to find out what information is on record about 
him; (3) there must be a way for an individual to prevent information 
collected about him for one purpose from being used for another pur­
pose; and (4) an individual should be able to correct inaccurate 
information. 180 
173. Id. § 1681m. 
174. 12 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E). 
175. Washburn, Electronic Journalism, Computers and Privacy, 3 CoMPUTER/L. J. 
189, 195 (1982) (quoting Halls, Raiding the Databanks: A Developing Problem/or Technol­
ogists and Lawyers, 5 J. CoNTEMP. L. 256 (1979». 
176. Id. 
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. 1980). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at XX. Specifically the report recommended the 
enactment of a Federal Code of Fair Information Practice resting on five basic principles 
that would be given legal effect as "safeguard requirements" for automated personal data 
systems: 
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence 
is secret. 
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about 
him is in a record and how it is used. 
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that 
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The Act provides for access by data subjects. 181 Additionally, it 
requires procedures for the correction of challenged information. 182 
Moreover, no disclosure of personal information may be made without 
written consent. 183 The Act imposes limitations on data collection 
about individuals to information which is relevant and necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate agency purpose. The agency must maintain 
records with accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness to as­
sure fairness to the individual. 184 The Act established four actions for 
civil remedies. An individual may bring an action if the agency fails to 
comply with the Act's requirements: by failing to amend an individ­
ual's record in accordance with his request; 185 by failing to maintain 
an individual's record in the above prescribed manner; 186 or by not 
complying with the Act in such a way as to cause an adverse effect on 
the individual. I87 An individual may bring an action to compel pro­
duction of his records and the court may enjoin the agency from with­
holding such records. 188 In addition, the court may order an agency 
to amend an individual's records in accordance with his request. 189 
An individual may recover actual damagesl90 and reasonable attorney 
fees and other litigation costsl91 in appropriate situations. Jurisdiction 
lies with district courts of the United States. l92 
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for their pur­
poses without his consent. 
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identi­
fiable information about him. 
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended 
use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of data. 
Id. 
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552 a(d) (1982). 
182. Id. 
183. 5 U.S.C. § 552 a(b)(l974). Some of the exceptions are important. They include 
disclosure to the National Archives of the United States, Id. § 552 a(b)(6); Bureau of Cen­
sus,Id. § 552 a(b)(4); to another agency or instrumentality of the government for a civil or 
criminal law enforcement activity, /d. § 552 (b)(7); to a person pursuant to a showing of 
compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual, Id. § 552 a(b)(8); 
to either House of Congress, Id. § 552 a(b)(9); pursuant to the order of a court of compe­
tent jurisdiction. Id. § 552 a(b)(ll). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. § 552 a(g)(I)(A)(B). 
186. Id. § 552 a(g)(I)(C). 
187. Id. § 552 a(g)(I)(D). 
188. Id. § 552 a(g)(3)(A). 
189. Id. § 552 a(g)(2)(A). 
190. Id. § 552 a(g)(4)(A). The act provides for minimum damages of $1,000 in cases 
in which the agency violates the act wilfully or intentionally. Id. 
191. Id. §§ 552 a(g)(2)(B); 552 a(g)(4)(A); 552 a(g)(4)(B). 
192. Id. § 552 a(g)(I)(D). 
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With regard to medical records, the extent to which this ap­
proach of notice and opportunity to object can be effective in eliminat­
ing improper agency practices depends on the participation of 
consumer and provider groups such as public interest groups involved 
in health care issues, medical societies concerned about government 
intrusions on the doctor-patient relationship, or other related associa­
tions which are able to provide guidance. 193 
The Act has been criticized because it is confined to federal sys­
tems. Many commentators feel that the consumer's right of privacy is 
"far more vulnerable to computerized invasion by the private sector 
than by government agencies."194 
The Act did create a Privacy Protection Study Commission to 
investigate the private sector and make recommendations. 195 The Pri­
vacy Protection Commission made one hundred sixty-two specific rec­
ommendations. 196 There were three major public policy objectives:. to 
minimize intrusiveness; to maximize fairness; and to create a legiti­
mate and enforceable expectation of confidentiality when this expecta­
tion is warranted. In order to. accomplish these objectives, the 
Commission recommended that certain principles be adhered to: only 
information relevant to the particular matter at hand should be col­
lected; information should not be transferred to third parties without 
the subject's approval; the individual should be informed as to what 
sources will be contacted in order to gather information and how it 
will subsequently be used; an individual should have the right to see 
any file about him and be able to correct inaccurate information; secret 
files should be outlawed; proper authorization of government officials 
should be required before they are permitted access to files; and orga­
nizations should only employ service and support firms whose privacy 
standards are substantially similar to the organization being served. 197 
The Commission urged that individuals be afforded a right of ac­
tion against offenders of these principles. Court costs, actual damages, 
and general damages of $1,000 to $10,000 should be recoverable. The 
substance of the recommendations was to chip away at the construc­
tive "property right" which organizations asserted with respect to the 
193. Id. 
194. Washburn, supra note 175, at 193. 
195. This Commission was established by P.L. 93-579, § 5 88 stat. 1905 (1984) codi­
fied in 5 U.S.C. § 522 (a)(1977), and ceased to exist on Sept. 30, 1977 by the terms of the 
enactment as amended by P.L. 95-38,91 stat. 1979 (1977). 
196. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
197. Id. 
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personal information maintained in their files. 198 
The Act has many weaknesses. Litigants may be deterred be­
cause of the low visibility of many information misuses, being unable 
to identify a direct causal relationship with a denial of a benefit to a 
violation of the statute. Further, disclosure may be immunized under 
an exception. The difficulty of proving the requisite intent for actual 
damages may render litigation worthless. The ultimate burden falls on 
the consumer. Despite its limitations, the Privacy Act of 1974 was a 
significant, although tentative step towards evolution of a comprehen­
sive system of legal safeguards for information about individuals. 199 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974200 re­
quires schools and colleges which receive federal funds to grant stu­
dents or their parents access to student records and restricts disclosure 
of such information to third parties.201 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976202 provides for the confidentiality of 
individual tax returns and limits disclosure to third parties. The Right 
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978203 provides bank customers with pri­
vacy regarding their bank's records by giving individuals notice and a 
chance to challenge requests by federal agents for the records. 204 
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980205 gives protection against 
the search and seizure of materials in the possession of the media such 
as a newspaper's records or files by law enforcement authorities in­
cluding federal, state, and local agencies.206 Only if the custodian of 
the materials is suspected of criminal activity or in order to prevent 
death or serious bodily harm will these safeguards be waived.207 The 
198. Id. 
199. Boyer. supra note 51. at 95. 
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976) amended by 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(5) (Supp. III 1979). 
201. The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 is popularly referred to 
as the Buckley Amendment. 
202. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
203. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. IV 1980). 
204. In 1976 the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 
435 (1976) held that an individual had no expectation of privacy with regard to his bank 
records. as they were the property of the bank. Id. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 
1978 was in direct response to Miller and thus overruled the decision. In addition Congress 
inserted the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455. 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). which 
states that the government must give notice to a taxpayer when it serves a summons from 
the Internal Revenue Service. 
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (Supp. IV 1980). 
206. The Act is in contradiction to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
which upheld the right of the police to search a student newsroom. and consequently 
caused much concern amongst the press and ordinary citizens as well. 
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 aa(b) (1982). The exceptions to surprise searches are: (1) if 
the reporter or author can reasonably be suspected of having committed the crime being 
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Attorney General is directed to issue procedural guidelines by the law 
with respect to obtaining materials in the possession of other innocent 
persons.20S Subsequently, the Department of Justice restricted the use 
of search warrants where subpoenas will suffice when seeking docu­
ments, tape recordings, or similar material from journalists, lawyers, 
doctors, and clergymen who are not suspected of any crime.209 
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1980 requires banking insti­
tutions using electronic fund transfers to notify their customers about 
any third-party access to customer accounts.210 
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966211 represented signifi­
cant legislation in delineating the individual's rights to privacy. Pres­
ent government information policy is primarily regulated by the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 1974. 
The FOIA gives every person the right to review government records. 
Federal agencies have authority to withhold personal data which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.212 The 
agency, however, not the individual, is given discretion to decide 
which disclosures meet this criterion.213 The Act has been criticized 
as "an instrument for disclosing information rather than for balancing 
the conflicting interests that surround the public disclosure and use of 
personal records."214 In fact, the 1974 Privacy Act's Conditions of 
Disclosure Section reflects the Congressional response to the potential 
for abuse of disclosure regarding personal information.2ls 
The individual's right to know prevails in the 1966 Act, and fed­
eral records are available for public inspection and copying. This has 
actually made the Act and privacy conflict. The Act opens records to 
everyone, which is in direct conflict to the data subject's desire to keep 
his records private and confidential. Further, the Act has unfortu­
nately been used for improper purposes and benefits the wrong people. 
Many people have used the Act successfully to obtain information 
investigated; (2) if serious injury or death will result if the materials are not immediately 
seized; (3) if the materials would be destroyed or altered if advance notice of a subpoena 
were given; and (4) if an individual has failed to turn over materials that have been legally 
subpoenaed. Jd. § 2000aa(b). 
208. Id. § 2000aa-l1. 
209. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303, 1304 (1981). 
210. IS U.S.C. 1693 (1982 Supp.) 
211. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). 
212. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 35. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 a(b) (1982). 
213. 5 U.S.C. § 552a b(1)-(9) (1982). 
214. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 35. 
215. Comment, Federal Legislative Proposals/or the Protection 0/ PriWlcy, 8 FORD. 
URB. L. J. 773,787 (1979). 
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about business competitors or adversaries in litigation.216 Professor 
Arthur Miller has stated that the "Act probably does more to end 
privacy in the United States, ostensibly in the pursuit of the public's 
right to know than any other enactment in the last 50 or 60 years."211 
It is a difficult task for federal agencies and courts to balance the pub­
lic's right to know against an individual's right to privacy.2lS Further, 
the terms of the Act are inadequate for dealing with computerized 
record-keeping. It deals with only two aspects of record-keeping prac­
tice-data collection and data dissemination.219 
The Federal Reports Act of 1976220 requires that federal agencies 
get approval from the Office of Management and Budget before col­
lecting "information upon identical items from ten or more per­
sons."22I The purpose of the Act was to maximize the usefulness of 
the information collected, rather than to further personal privacy. 
The Act makes no mention of personal privacy "nor recognizes any 
rights for individuals with respect to the personal-data record-keeping 
practices of the federal government. "222 
IV. COMPUTER SECURITY 
Many believe that safeguarding the privacy of individuals is a 
matter properly reserved for the legislature, but that solutions for pro­
tecting confidential data in automated systems are to be found in tech­
nological safeguards. 223 
Infringements on individual privacy although extensive should 
not be accepted as an ine~table outgrowth of technological advance­
216. Freedman, The Right 0/Privacy in the Age o/Computer Data and Processing, 13 
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1361, 1380 (1982). 
Congress did not intend to permit litigants to use the FOIA instead of the 
discovery mechanism provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. H.R. 
1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966). When the FOIA was amended in 1974 ... 
congressmen were careful to state that they did not desire to permit increased 
access to investigation files in lieu of discovery. 
Id. at 1380, n. 81 (quoting 120 CoNG. REC. 17033 (1974)(statement of Sen. Hart». 
217. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 25-26. (statement of A. Miller, professor of 
law, Univ. of Michigan). 
218. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979) (holding that a party 
submitting documents to a federal agency does not have the right to enjoin their 
disclosure). 
219. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 35. 
220. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3511 (1976). 
221. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 35. 
222. Id. 
223. Freedman, supra note 216, at 1398-99. 
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ment.224 The crossroads of two trends-more automated information 
systems and more attention to the individual's privacy rights represent 
a great challenge. Neither the legal, nor the technological community 
has handled the conflict adequately. The privacy problem today has 
economic, political, regulatory, domestic, and international dimen­
sions, as well as technological and legal dimensions. 225 
The Computer Industry Association has voiced concern that the 
technological development of secure data processing systems repre­
sents a complex and extensive undertaking which is not feasible for 
most manufacturers.226 One suggestion is that consideration should 
be given to the creation of a federally chartered non-profit "Super Un­
derwriters Laboratory," which would be responsible for developing 
technological solutions to the data security problem.227 
Most approaches to providing technological safeguards include 
controlling access to the systems based on the principle of isolation.228 
Mechanisms are provided for isolating data and cannot be bypassed by 
the users of the system.229 In conjunction with this approach, mecha­
nisms for identifying users and authorizing their access to the system 
must be developed.230 
"An effective security system must include the total environment: 
physical and procedural safeguards as well as those provided by hard­
ware and software."231 Three goals encompassed by technical security 
include: (1) Protection of data against physical mishaps, such as fire, 
flood, theft, or destruction; (2) controlled access to the system by au­
thorized personnel; and (3) integrity of the system-the system per­
forms in accordance with specifications and there are appropriate 
checks on the accuracy of its data.232 
General guidelines for the design of hardware to eliminate poten­
. tial data security problems can never replace continuous review of 
each product, because one can never predict all the problems which 
may occur.233 Even if the system is adequately designed, there is al­
ways the possibility that a leak may occur through an error in its im­
224. Davis, A Technologist's View ofPrivacy and Security in Automated Information 
Systems, 4 RUTGERS J. CoMPUTER L. 264 (1974). 
225. Id. at 265. 
226. PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at IX. 
227. Id. Data security includes the protection of all files. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at X. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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plementation.234 Additionally, there is the problem of remote users. 
There may be many terminals connected simultaneously and access is 
often by means of a video screen or keyboard printer terminal. Three 
potential dangers identified by Professor Barron are: (1) impersona­
tion caused by people masquerading as others entitled to the informa­
tion; (2) accidental leakage of information caused by a malfunction of 
the system; and (3) wire-tapping.23s 
Although the demand for data security is growing, customers still 
rank computer security features below other considerations, such as 
price, performance, and other special capabilities. Perhaps the follow­
ing is the most pragmatic definition of security: "a system is secure 
when the cost of obtaining illicit access to the information exceeds the 
value of the information so obtained. "236 Anyone with enough money 
can compile a detailed individual dossier, even from the sources of a 
decentralized manual filing system. At one time, the high cost of such 
a project effectively eliminated those with only a casual curiosity in the 
information from undertaking it. With the advancement of technol­
ogy, however, this is no longer true.237 
Professor Barron states that, "contrary to popular opinion, the 
computer per se is not a major threat to society."238 The technology 
exists to make computerized databanks secure. It is rarely used at 
present, however, because it is not generally understood within the 
computer industry, and because it is very expensive.239 
Technological security must be purchased and so far there has 
been no profit motive in the industry to provide security systems. As 
the computer is used more in privacy sensitive areas, the industry 
should be forced to realize that it is marketing a potentially dangerous 
product and like the automobile manufacturer the industry should be 
expected to take the responsibility for providing the necessary safety 
features. 240 
V. CONCLUSION 
Patchwork legislation and confusion will persist in America until a 
234. D.W. BARRON, PRIVACY, PEOPLE NOT COMPUTERS 319,323 (1978). 
235. Id. at 325-26. 
236. Id. at 328. 
237. The Computerization of Government Files, What Impact on the Individual? 15 
UCLA L. REV. 1371 (1968). 
238. BARRON, supra note 234, at 319. 
239. Id. 
240. Washburn, supra note 175, at 208 (quoting Meldman, Centralized Information 
Systems and the Legal Right to Privacy, 4 CoMPUTER L. SERVo 5-2 an. 2 at 6 (1969». 
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national privacy policy is established and consistent guidelines for­
mulated that apply to all segments of society .... Personal pri­
vacy can no longer exist by yesterday's standards.241 
Many Americans now agree with Professor Linowes. A Harris 
survey indicated that public concern over privacy and the abuse or 
misuse of personal information by business and government has in­
creased steadily throughout the Seventies.242 "In a very real sense, 
computers are at the heart of the concerns over the loss or potential 
loss of privacy of personal data. "243 
Minor differences notwithstanding, "there is nothing peculiarly 
American about the feeling that the struggle of the individual versus 
computer is a fixed feature of modem life. "244 The problems are uni­
versal: loss of individuality and control; creation of dossiers; and cen­
tralized bureaucracies.245 
In a world shrinking due to technological advances, domestic law 
is not the only answer. International law is necessary. It is interesting 
to note that European data protection laws were originally privacy 
protection laws. Europeans are now concerned with how much, not if, 
protection should be afforded.246 One must see the whole picture; 
computerized informational privacy is part of the right to privacy gen­
erally and this is a basic human right which must be protected by 
concerted efforts by organized society throughout the world.247 
A. The Patient's Progress Toward Recovery ofHis Privacy 
Federal legislation is necessary to provide safeguards for privacy. 
However, it is also necessary for the states to enact appropriate legisla­
tion. One state, California, enacted the Confidentiality of Medical In­
formation Act, effective January I, 1982.248 The Act limits the 
circumstances under which an individual's medical records can be 
241. Linowes, supra note 32, at 1184. 
242. L. HARRIS & A. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, A National Opinion 
Research Survey of Attitudes Toward Privacy (1981). 
243. Id. at 76. In the survey the following were cited as the five biggest invaders of 
privacy from the private sector: finance companies (45%); credit bureaus (44%); insurance 
companies (38%); credit card companies (37%); newspapers, magazines and television 
(31 %). From the public sector, Americans feel the biggest privacy invaders are: Internal 
Revenue Service (38%); CIA (34%); FBI (33%); Government welfare agencies (32%); 
Census Bureau (24%). Id. 
244. HEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 167. 
245. Id. 
246. Evans, European Data Protection Law, 29 AM. J. CoMP. L. 571, 574 (1981). 
247. Freedman, supra note 216, at 1398-99. 
248. Cal. Civ. Code § 56 (West 1982). See Plishner, supra note 5, at 251. 
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disclosed. It covers all health care records, although it does allow for 
certain limited .uses of that information. Medical information cannot 
be disclosed without the patient's written authorization, except be­
tween health care providers for the purpose of diagnosis or 
treatment.249 
The Act does not address the patient's right of access to personal 
medical records, but another law passed in 1982 does. Except for lim­
ited situations dealing with mental health records, each individual has 
the right of access to complete information regarding his condition 
and the care provided to him.2so 
To accommodate the competing considerations in computerized 
medical records it may be helpful to recognize that most of the advan­
tages achieved by the compilation of statistical data could be achieved 
without the recording of personally identifiable information. Such bi­
furcation should be considered in the initial transfer of information to 
the computer. Further, patients should be informed if the information 
supplied may be subsequently released to third parties, and of the pos­
sible consequences of disclosure. Additionally, written consent should 
be obtained from the patient before any information is disclosed.2sI 
Legislative support prohibiting certain types of requests or adequate 
warnings regarding disclosure might be appropriate. To help guard 
against inaccurate information, patients upon request should be per­
mitted to inspect their own files. Further, there should be definite time 
limits for keeping "stale" information. This is particularly necessary 
in cases in which a patient has left psychiatric or mental health ther­
apy. The stigma on the individual far outweighs the necessity for 
keeping the information indefinitely. 
Centralized health computer systems are both a promise and a 
threat. Used correctly the benefits could be maximized and the dan­
gers minimized.2s2 
B. Alternative Treatment Plans: Personal Privacy 
Some commentators have advocated an amendment to the Fed­
eral Constitution to clearly and unequivocally establish the right to 
personal privacy. At least three state constitutions have a specific 
right of privacy-California,2s3 Alaska,2s4 and South Carolina.2ss 
249. Pilsner, supra note 5, at 251. 
250. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25250-58 (West 1982). 
251. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
252. Gobert, supra note 2, at 186-87. 
253. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (West 1982). 
254. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (1980). 
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Where disclosure of personal information is not clearly proscribed by 
statute, a constitutional right to privacy would put any organization 
making such a disclosure at the peril of being a defendant in a poten­
tial law suit. 
Another suggestion is to extend tort liability to the computer in­
formation processor. The processor would be liable for any breach of 
due care, which would include reasonable inquiry and be judged 
against standards of an ordinarily prudent person within the industry 
and under similar circumstances. Further, consideration should be 
given to eliminating the requirement of proof as to actual damages.256 
Other suggestions to protect privacy include the appointment of 
an ombudsman to supervise data systems, or the creation of a federal 
regulatory agency to control all computerized data systems. 
Some commentators have urged that control provisions be tai­
lored to the nature of the data systems, with separate legislation for 
computerized medical systems, criminal justice systems, and credit re­
porting organizations. Westin and Baker state: 
[I]t appears clear to us that no single law, constitutional amend­
ment, or court decision can cope with the tremendous diversity of 
issues and settings, and the uneven readiness for corrective action, 
that make up the current data-bank problem. Such total solutions 
are not worth pursuing.257 
There are no easy solutions. The ultimate answer lies with the 
public. Politics and policy will ultimately dictate future action or in­
action. In conclusion, it is important to maintain the following goals 
in the area of privacy: 
1. 	 There should be some legitimate purpose for the collection of 
information; 
2. 	 An organization should not transfer information to a third­
party without the subject's consent; 
3. 	 An individual should have notice that information is being col­
lected, who will get the information, and how it will be used; 
4. 	 No information should be obtained under false pretenses; 
5. 	 The individual should have the continuing right to see and copy 
records about himself that any organization has on file; 
6. 	 If the accuracy of information is questioned, the individual 
should have the right to correct the record; 
255. S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 9 (1977). 
256. G. Stevens, H. Hoffman, Ton Liability for Defamation by Computer, 6 J. OF 
COMPUTERS AND L. 91, 102 (1977). 
257. A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, supra note 64, at 350-51. 
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7. 	 If the statement is in dispute, a permanent copy of the state­
ment of the individual's position should be attached to the 
record; 
8. 	 Disclosure should be made only to authorized parties and only 
after consent by the individual has been freely given; 
9. 	 The retention of information should have a time limit and mate­
rial no longer useful for the particular purpose for which it was 
collected should be destroyed; and 
10. There should be an administrative procedure for resolving 
disputes. 
It is not technology as such, which affects society for good or bad, 
but its uses, which are, in form, shaped by the values of society and 
by the historical context in which the technology is used.... We 
must remember that we are not trapped helplessly in front of an 
unstoppable technological steamroller. Our control is how we use 
our knowledge that we will be required to live with the results of 
our decisions on the use of this new technology.2s8 
258. F. Weingarten, Privacy: A Terminal Idea, 10 HUM. RTS. J. 56 (1982). 
